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1. Introduction. 
 
Human domination over nature has been a constant concern of environmental thinkers. For decades 
now, they have made efforts to describe the historical-cum-intellectual process that produces such 
domination (see Merchant 1980, Plumwood 1993). By sheding a new light on past ideas and 
practices, as well as on the relation between them, they have been able to unmask the ideological 
underpinnings of domination. This explains why the latter has mostly been seen as unproblematic 
or not «seen» at all -it has been «naturalized» in human societies. Mostly, they have interpreted 
domination as the convenient outcome of the artificial separation between humanity and nature, a 
dualism that involves a hierarchy locating humans over nature (see Leiss 1974). In this regard, 
modernity reinforces rather than inaugurates the project of human mastery over the environment -
but it certainly gives it a new, powerful intensity (see Vetlesen 2015). To sum it up, the enlightened 
attempt to understand the world in scientific terms is no other than to control, manipulate and 
change natural processes to satisfy human interests (Katz 1997: 52). This argument goes a long way 
to explain why environmentalism has had a powerful anti-modern streak. 
 
Now, the emergence of the Anthropocene -a geological-cum-ecological hypothesis about the human 
impact on the planet as a whole- lends a new urgency to the study of domination. It is not a 
coincidence that the most intense anthropogenic disruption of planetary systems takes place during 
modernity -first with the Industrial Revolution and then with the so-called Great Acceleration (see 
Steffen et al. 2007, McNeill 2000). From this vantage point, the Anthropocene offers itself as the 
culmination of the human subjugation of nature -it is thus only fitting that this new time is addressed 
as «the human epoch». Yet the scale of human domination in the Anthropocene is said to be reducing 
biodiversity at an alarming rate, thus compromising the very habitability of the Earth upon which 
humans themselves depend (see Newbold et al. 2016). The critique and removal of domination 
seems thus as necessary as ever. 
 
But is this the only way of looking at domination? Or does the Anthropocene offer a vantage point 
from which domination can be seen differently? If so, how does the Anthropocene impinge on this 
concept? What does it mean for a renewed analysis and critique of human domination? Does the 
Anthropocene say something new about how domination is carried out? What would the alleged 
transition from the Holocene to the Anthropocene involve as far as domination is concerned? Do 
new possibilities for reducing or eliminating domination open up with the new epoch? 
 
This paper will examine these questions. I will begin by examining the argument according to which 
the Anthropocene deepens human domination while exposing it from its very designation.  Then, I 
will suggest that a different interpretation of the Anthropocene is possible as far as domination is 
concerned. This opens the door to an alternative understanding of human domination, the 
foundations of which I present in the next two sections. Finally, I will close the paper with an 
exploration of the way that may lead towards an enlightened domination -or managed liberation- of 
nature in the good Anthropocene. 
 
2. Dominating Nature in the Human Epoch. 
 
From food production to medical experimentation and social recreation, the human domination of 
nature is remarkably multifaceted. The concept cannot always be applied so neatly. The 
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disappearance of species due to habitat loss, for instance, does not fit easily into the category of 
domination yet it might be considered an unintended side-effect of human behavior. Other human 
practices, like pet ownership, fall into a grey zone insofar as domesticated animals depend on 
humans for their well-being. But even accounting for exemptions, the intensity with which human 
beings subject nonhumans requires theoretical, moral, and political attention. 
 
By «domination of nature» I will be referring to those human practices and actions that, no matter 
which their ultimate goal, lead to the curtailment of nature's autonomy. In other words, dominating 
nature means interfering with the autonomous unfolding of the beings that belong to it. Thus I am 
restricting domination to practices that affect natural beings that are alive, whatever their degree of 
«sentience» is. I will leave aside those actions that touch upon nonhuman components of nature, like 
rivers or mountains, which however can be taken into account as far as they affect living beings that 
depend on them -as fishes living in rivers, for instance. Attempts to regulate the climate would thus 
be attempts to control rather than dominate it -a distinction that is far from meaningless. This 
restriction is meant to avoid a conceptual stretching of «domination» that, by applying the notion to 
all kinds of human-induced harms to all kinds of nonhuman entities, ends up neutralizing its 
descriptive force. That said, the range of human actions covered by this conceptualization is wide 
enough and in fact the suppression of domination is barely imaginable. In other words, eliminating 
this kind of domination makes for an ideal theory of non-domination, as opposed to a non-ideal 
theory of non-domination that would accept from the outset that some degree of domination (see 
Rawls 1999). We will come back to this. 
 
A first thought about domination in the Anthropocene concerns the latter term itself. Might it not be 
interpreted as a declaration of unashamed anthropocentrism? By naming a geological epoch after 
themselves, human beings seems to suggest that the planet is theirs and for them to use. Afer all, the 
name of the new epoch puts humanity at the center of Earth's history, turning the anthropos into the 
main character of the planetary drama. This may indicate a deal of megalomania on the part of living 
humans, as Mark Sagoff (2018) has pointed out in his dennounciation of the «Narcisscene», i.e. the 
unwarranted belief that the human species is producing decisive changes in the planet. We are 
somehow flattered by such news: 
 
«The Anthropocene reclaims the power and dominance of human beings who, pace Darwin, far from acting 
like siblings of the apes, so rule over the plants and animals of the wild that they will soon kill off most of them» 
(Sagoff 2018). 
 
On the contrary, Sagoff claims, there are no scientific evidences that a sixth extincion is underway 
and, as some heterodox ecologist suggest, nature may be more resilient that it seems. In any event, 
the question for him is that we are not the main characters in the planet's evolution. It should be 
pointed out, however, that stratigraphers are more interested in geological changes than in the fact 
that humans seem to be driving them -it just happens to be men who are behind them (see 
Zalasiewicz et al. 2017). 
 
Yet the Anthropocene's anthropocentrism poses a particular risk as far as domination is concerned. 
If the conversation about the Anthropocene keeps focusing on the dangerous disruption of planetary 
systems, fear of extinction can relegate nonhuman emancipation indefinitely. Hence the 
contemporary resonance of the «end of the world» and even the reflection upon what happens after 
extinction (see Danowski & Viveiros de Castro 2017, Grusin 2018). Andrew Dobson (1995) 
proposed an early distinction between the public and the private environmentalist, according to 
which the private environmentalist wishes to protect the nonhuman world but wears the mask of 
the public environmentalist who alerts the public about the threat of ecological collapse. It is not 
hard to see that the Anthropocene threatens to further obscure the case of the public 
environmentalist which emphasizes human survival over nature's domination in his attempt to 
persuade the public to tackle unsustainability -or, in a more desperate fashion, to conjure up 
unhabitability. Thus an anthropocentric twist might take place within an already anthropocentric 
worldview. 
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And yet this may lead to an appreciation of the nonhuman world as a provider of planetary services 
and as performer of functions that are beneficial to human beings -so that its protection may prevent 
planetary collapse. The consumption of meat at a global level, for instance, is discouraged on account 
of the amount of resources required for cattle breeding which in turn deliver methane that 
contribute to global warming. More generally, the loss of biodiversity is pointed out as a grave 
danger for the habitability of the Earth. In this reading, protecting the nonhuman world would be 
conditioned to the contribution that the latter makes to human survival: an anthropocentric 
justification that leaves aside moral arguments about the emancipation of animals, not to mention 
the autonomy of rivers or ecological processes. 
 
In this sense, the Anthropocene may be seen as culminating the process of human alienation from 
nature as described by environmental thinkers. This would happen in a particular way: instead of 
reinforcing the separation between humans and the nonhuman world, the Anthropocene would 
signal an intimate relation by which the former penetrate even more deeply in the latter. As a result, 
the whole planet shows traces of human activity and many species are threatened due to habitat 
loss. Most damagingly, the rise of human population has increased the number of animals employed 
to feed an increasing number of human beings -either by killing, fishing or abusing them in different 
ways. In view of this massive predation, it is argued, animals are scared of us: «The fear of animals 
towards human beings is the inner side of the Anthropocene» (Soengten 2018: 30). There is no way 
to demonstrate the validity of such claim, but reasons abound for that fear to exist. 
 
Moreover, the language of the Anthropocene has been criticized for overshadowing the colonization 
and destruction of nature. The emphasis on the metabolic exchange between society and nature, 
which leads to the idea that social and natural systems are now materially «coupled» (see Liu 2007), 
has given creedence to the claim that instead of a separation between society and nature there exists 
a «socionatural entanglement» (see Arias-Maldonado 2015). For those who deplore the 
anthropocentric undertones of this argument, the Anthropocene is but the last disguise of human 
exploitation: 
 
«When "destruction" becomes "transformation", when the "hybrid narrative" is supposed to summarize the 
whole history of humanity (without issues of scales), when "human capital" and "natural capital" become 
interchangeable notions, it is the sign that a program of epistemic and ontological derealization is at work, as 
well as the dis-qualification of politics and democratic choices in the making of our possible socio-ecological 
future» (Fremaux & Barry 2019: 57). 
 
The Anthropocene, or more specifically the ecomodernist interpretation of the Anthropocene as 
interpreted by its critics, would thus be tantamount to a new -or renewed- ideology of domination. 
According to Fremaux (2019: 28), ecomodernism combines a hypermodern narrative of control with 
a postmodern narrative of hibridity, the latter providing a view of nature not as a separate entity but 
as «a fluid techno-reality mixed with the products (and waste) of technology» in a way that prevents 
us from talking about a natural «otherness». On his part, Pellizzoni (2015) has argued that the new 
urge towards the mastery of nature is not predicated upon a conception of nature as an ontologically 
thick and stable agent. Dualism, in other words, is passé: 
 
«If ecologism developed around the idea of a perturbed natural equilibrium to be restored as much as possible, 
this view is increasingly challenged by an account of the world as intrinsically disordered and unstable; a 
condition not only to be acknowledged, but exploited and even enjoyed» (Pellizzoni 2015: 11). 
 
This socionatural intimacy, which is presented as a promiscuous set of relations that run in several 
directions, would be ultimately embodied by the concept of the Anthropocene. Yet the latter has also 
been described as way of justifying  the destruction that takes place, rather unidirectionally, in those 
hybrid worlds where some agencies are more harmful than others (see Fremaux and Barry 2019). 
At the same time, though, the ecological crisis itself -or climate change, for that matter- shows that 
nature is not entirely subsumed in human power (Fremaux 2019: 20). In philosophical jargon, 
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nature is non-identical with human beings and cannot be reduced to concepts nor simply 
«appropriated» by social processes. This surplus takes the form of those planetary risks that are 
associated to the Anthropocene: 
 
«To ignore nature’s non-identity or, in other words, to pursue the domination and appropriation project while 
ignoring its dramatic impacts, leads to the "return of nature" on the scene of human history in the form of 
biological dysfunctionalities and environmental catastrophes» (Fremaux 2019: 29). 
 
More dramatically than in the past, then, the risk of uninhabitability posed by the Earth's disruption 
reinstates the credibility of an old green claim -namely, that nature cannot ever be dominated. In 
Katz's words: “Nature’s control is a dream, a delusion, a hallucination” (Katz 1992: 267). Proposals 
such as geo-engineering the climate system or biologically enhacing human beings for reducing their 
ecological footprint would however show how widespread is the belief that we can actually master 
nature (see Boyd 2008, Liao et al. 2012). Such projects pursue a technological «fix» that leaves 
patterns of production and consumption untouched -an optimistic projection of future technological 
progress that, according to its critics, seeks to «de-politicize» environmental policy (Keary 2016). 
The ideological foundations of domination may change with time, but the will to dominate remains 
in place. 
 
What is the alternative? How should human beings relate to nature? For the sake of the argument, I 
am going to develop this point drawing upon Mick Smith's (2011) critique of human sovereignty 
over nature. For him, radical ecology contests human dominion over the natural world, i.e. 
«ecological sovereignty in all its many guises» (Smith 2011: xi). Such dominion would be the key 
principle underpinning the modern political constitution, which explains how difficult it is to remove 
the beliefs that support it. If ethics is -following Iris Murdoch- an exercise in attempting to see and 
respond to the world as it is, environmental ethics tries to turn nature into an ethically considerable 
entity by calling attention to its otherness, to the natural realities that exist independently of us. 
Therefore, ethics «requires a suspension or clearing of our self-referential obsessions, the distorting 
influences of that self-regard which always tends to reconstitute others as somehow being like us, 
or suiting our interests» (Smith 2011: 41). In a word: nature is not the same as us, nor does it exists 
for us. As a consequence, nature is never just a resource and exceeds the boundaries and categories 
that human beings use to apprehend it. The alternative to domination can only be grounded on an 
ethical view oriented towards «a letting be that ceases to regard nature as means» (Smith 2011: 
117). Yet radical ecology cannot accept half-hearted approaches based upon the so-called 
«stewardship» of nature, as the latter 
 
«remains a fundamentally theocratic and paternalistic model wherein responsibilities for nature are actually 
inseparable from subservience to God and potentially (...) to God's (self-proclaimed) representatives on Earth» 
(Smith 2011: 14). 
 
Natural reserves are an example of stewardship and are thus rejected by radical ecology insofar as 
they free nature from human domination «only by being already and always included within the 
remit of human domination» (Smith 2011: xiii). The reason is that such managed liberation 
reinforces what Giorgio Agamben has called «the anthropological machine» (see Agamben 2004) 
that defines the human as that which is not natural and vice versa. For radical ecology, then, only a 
genuine liberation of nature -as opposed to a managed liberation- counts as such. 
 
If the only true alternative to domination is non-domination, the Anthropocene seems to be a 
problem for anyone concerned withspreading environmental ethics. What differentiates the 
theoretical framework provided by the Anthropocene, after all, is the assumption that human 
transformation of nature is an indelible feature of the human habitation on Earth. The lens through 
which socionatural relations should be seen according to the Anthropocene account is seen by critics 
as a means to «normalize» domination, i.e. to present it as an unavoidable side-effect of human 
existence. But is this the only avalaible interpretation of the Anthropocene? Could it not be recruited 
for reducing, rather than eliminating, domination? 
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3. Reframing Human-Nature Relations in the Anthropocene. 
 
I would like to argue that the Anthropocene can provide a historical account of socionatural relations 
that makes it possible to see past and present human domination under a new light. This is a first 
step towards changing human practices of domination, as the epistemic turn provided by the 
Anthropocene concept opens up new possibilities for critique that do not rely on traditional 
arguments about dualism, human's lack of empathy, or capitalism's rapaciousness. As the 
Anthropocene simultaneously centers and decenters human beings, a new narrative about 
domination can be put forward -one that should help to diminish future domination. By no means it 
is suggested that radical ecology's argument are devoid of merit or value -on the contrary, they are 
irreplaceable contributions to a complex debate that however calls for different approaches. In fact, 
the arguments of radical ecology are not yet shared by the wider public and thus it seems advisable 
to look for alternative ways of presenting the critique of domination. 
 
For a start, the meaning of the Anthropocene should not be conflated with the meaning attributed 
to it by particular interpreters of the concept. The former is potentially richer than any of its 
versions, as the meaning of the hypothesis presented by geologists and Earth-system scientists 
cannot be exhausted nor fixed. On the contrary and given the scope of the subject, it is bound to be 
contentious and open to debate. The Anthropocene does not prescribe its own meaning nor 
prescribes a particular course of action for human beings (see Arias-Maldonado & Trachtenberg 
2019). As Lidskog and Waterton puts is: 
 
«The narrative of the Anthropocene is dynamic and changing: new layers of meaning are constantly added to 
old ones. (...) Thus, the narrative is still very much a concept in the making, involving a plurality of meanings, 
tensions and debates» (Lidskog & Waterton 2018: 31). 
 
Admittedly, its very denomination suggests a particular narrative about the current state of 
socionatural relations where the «human» component is given epistemic priority. Yet the whole 
point of the Anthropocene concept lies precisely in the proposition that human beings have 
disrupted planetary systems and become a global environmental force -hence the reference to the 
anthropos and the lack of any further distribution of responsibilities among humans, as this 
distribution is scientifically irrelevant. This whole frame can be rejected, as Sagoff (2018) does when 
questioning the evidence behind the Sixth Extinction (although the loss of biodiversity, prospects of 
massive extinction aside, can be substantial in itself). If the science that points to the coupling of 
social and natural systems by way of anthropogenic impact is accepted, then the Anthropocene 
provides a framework for discussion rather than a given set of beliefs about socionatural relations. 
Conceptual alternatives such as the «Capitalocene» or the «Tecnocene» thus emerge as critical 
responses to the Anthropocene proposition -but they do it under its umbrella, as it were (see Moore 
2014; Malm & Hornborg 2014). In a nutshell: we know what the Anthropocene is, not what the 
Anthropocene means.  
 
Granted: the Anthropocene puts human beings in the center of the planet's history, as the aggregated 
impact of their actions -both spatially and temporally- drives the global disruption of natural 
systems. On the face of it, you cannot be more anthropocentric. Yet the Anthropocene is esentially 
ambivalent: it simultaneously centers and decenters humanity. It decenters humanity insofar as it 
brings attention to the telluric dimension of socionatural relations. In the long history of the planet, 
humanity is an anecdote: according to the famous cosmic calendar conceived by the late Carl Sagan, 
our species appears on Earth around 11:48 PM in the last day of December -if that huge tract of time 
could be compressed in the span of a human year. The geological side of the Anthropocene dissipates 
the delusion of an effective control of human destiny. Paradoxes of the Anthropocene: the all-
powerful human agency that has disrupted natural systems seems much weaker under this light. We 
are no just biological beings, but earthly creatures that depend upon a plethora of organic and 
inorganic processes and phenomena (see Clark 2010, Yusoff 2013). They can also be threatening: 
hurricanes, earthquakes, asteroids, and viruses are potentially devastating «actants» against which 
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an effective human defence cannot always be mounted. In the last years, Earth Sciences have 
incorporated the neocatastrophist paradigm previously emerged in geological studies, according to 
which the planet has not been shaped just by slow processes of erosion and sedimentation -there 
have also been collisions with extra-terrestrial bodies, climatic and geomorphic turbulences, sudden 
multiplications or extinctions of species. Gradualism and catastrophism are probably balanced in 
the long run, but the importance of the latter cannot be dismissed (see Huggett 2011).  
 
The warning that is implicit in the neocatastrophist explanation is consistent with the transition 
from the Holocene to the Anthropocene, forcing us to see the planet with new eyes -less as a passive 
recipient of human colonization and more as an active power of unsurmountable force. The 
Anthropocene should awaken us to the otherness of the planet -hence references to a «defiant Earth» 
(Hamilton 2017) or an «inhuman nature» (Clark 2011). In that vein, Bruno Latour (2017) has 
emphasized how the goddess Gaia, once employed by James Lovelock to simbolize the self-
regulating ability of the planet as a whole, was also portrayed by the Greeks as an enraged and 
vengeful deity. Geology reminds us that the planet's history is a geohistorical adventure whose 
episodes have not been written by human beings. 
 
At least two more aspects of the Anthropocene possess this decentering quality. The first is deep 
time: by connecting the present with the long history of the planet, the life of the human species is 
contextalized in a completely different fashion. If officially accepted, the Anthropocene would be the 
third epoch of the Quaternary period, which closes the Cenozoic era that in turn belongs to the 
Fanerozoic eon beginning 542 million years ago. This is the time around which life exploded via the 
so-called Cambrian explosion, but it is hardly the beginning of Earth: the planet was formed, 
according to calculations, 4543 billion years ago. Such are the depths in which the planet is rooted, 
an abyss of time throughout which violent episodes such as glaciations and extinctions abound. As 
Brett Milligan (2013) has argued, we are bound to experience a «space-time vertigo» when 
pondering such vast extensions of time. In this context, the emergence of the anthropos is a minor 
episode rather than an alternative to geohistoric turbulences -despite it being a major event for us 
(see Davies 2016: 139). 
 
Then there is size. Humanity itself has become «colossal», as the planetary disruption created by it 
has no precedents in the animal kingdom (see Raffnsoe 2016: 12). Yet while the causal strength of 
the human species is made evident by phenomena such as climate change, biodiversity loss or the 
monstruous production of waste, it also brings forth realities that underline our insignificance. In 
this vein, the concept of the «hyperobject» as conceived by Morton (2013) is especially useful. He is 
alluding to things that are massively distributed on time and space in relation to human beings -
black holes, the Florida everglades, the biosphere, plutonium and the like. For Morton, hyperobjects 
represent the end of the world as a welcoming and stable home for human beings. Admittedly, the 
Earth was never that stable, but then again the Holocene had gotten us used to favourable conditions 
that might not be repeated in the Anthropocene. 
 
Realizing that the planet has a long and violent history prior to the appearance of human beings 
should thus contribute to a new kind of self-reflection on the part of living humans. Both geological 
eventfulness and the vulnerability of a «situated» biological existence should be incorporated into 
the human outlook. In turn, a planetary subjectivity should emerge -one that is aware of the need to 
keep the planet habitable. According to the chronology of the Anthropocene devised by Steffen et al. 
(2007), the last stage of the Anthropocene would precisely consist in the assumption of our role as 
geological agents at a global scale -together with its responsibilities. Let us recall that the human 
emission of greenhouse gases has delayed the next glaciation and changed the climate for at least 
100.000 years. By doing so, our impact can be compared to that of fluctuations in Earth's orbyt, 
which affect glaciation cycles (Chakrabarty 2018: 7). Moreover, the melting of Greenland's ice cover 
has been shown to have an observable effect on the angle of Earth's axis due to the decline in ice 
mass (Delanty and Mota 2017: 13). That is not so bad for a primate and yet it can be bad for the 
primate that we are. 
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By pointing out the primacy of human agency we are not just acknowledging how in normal 
conditions some agencies are more powerful than others, but also emphasizing the human difference 
vis-a-vis other animal species and non-sentient natural «actants». The historical record is clear that 
our species is more transformative and destructive than the rest (see Coole 2013: 460). In other 
words, humans might not be the center of things, but they -we- are able to think more deeply about 
their own situation and thus bear a special responsibility (Connolly 2013). Even Donna Haraway, 
which dislikes the concept of the Anthropocene and urges us to acknowledge that human beings are 
«with and of the earth», admits that «the doings of situated, actual human beings matter» (Haraway 
2016: 55). The reflective operation that can be elicited by the Anthropocene is thus also a starting 
point for feeling and thinking anew about domination. 
 
4. Towards an Alternative 
Understanding of Human Domination (I). 
 
For radical ecologists, as we saw, human domination over nature is not permissible and should thus 
be abolished. But then a key question must be answered: is domination avoidable? Or, to put it 
differently: has it just been a contingency, rather than a necessity, in the history of socionatural 
relations? These are important questions that often remain unexplored because the focus is set on 
the ideas that have justified domination and on the forms it has adopted. Yet a different view on 
domination can be envisaged if we see the latter as a permanent, universal feature of socionatural 
relations. But if we focus on the degree and character of domination rather than on its existence, the 
goals themselves change: instead of eliminating domination, the latter should be reduced and 
softened as much as possible. It is not a matter of desiderability, since an ideal world would certainly 
be devoid of any relation of domination, but rather of feasibility. 
 
My main argument, then, is that domination -understood as the instrumental use of nonhuman 
beings for satisfying human interests- is less a historical contingency than an feature of socionatural 
relations. The forms and the intensity of that domination are historically contingent -but domination, 
as such, is not. The reason is that there is no way to prevent human-nature friction once human 
beings start to roam the Earth. As Raymond Williams put it in rather Marxian terms: 
 
«once we begin to speak of men mixing their labour with the earth, we are in a whole world of new relations 
between man and nature, and to separate natural history from social history becomes extremely problematic» 
(Williams 1980: 76). 
 
And while it would be tempting to describe the Earth prior to human emergence as some sort of 
sustainable Eden, we have seen that the planet has always been a fairly turbulent place. The 
distinctiveness of the human species lies in how we adapt to nature by adapting nature to us. In 
order to acquire autonomy from natural constrictions, humans try to control nature and only after 
enough control has been secured can we discuss how that dominion should be exerted. Yet even if 
human beings decided to embrace the goals of radical ecology, they could only liberate nature after 
having decided it and having carefully looked for ways to implement that demanding project. And 
while cultures may differ, history has always involved human domination of nature in various 
degrees (Sheldrake 1990: 26). Whether they are considered unique or shared with other animals, 
the exceptional abilities of the human species could not help but lead to the transformation, 
disruption, and destruction of the natural environment. That's how we got the Anthropocene in the 
first place. 
 
It should be emphasized that there is an ontological unity between humanity and nature. Yet the 
critique of the dualism nature-humanity that often features in green accounts of domination may be 
misplaced. Could it not be the case that there actually exists a separation between humanity and 
nature? It would not be an ontological separation, but a historically developed one: an emergent 
order produced by human beings in the course of their aggresive adaptation to the environment. To 
put it crudely, such adaptation will count as successful if the human population increases -as it has. 
Obviously, domination is detrimental to the number and life conditions of other species, as well as 
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to the integrity of ecosystems and biological processes. Ultimately, it can be maladaptive for humans 
if the habitability of the planet -as the Anthropocene suggests- becomes imperiled. But from this 
viewpoint domination is less a decision than a necessity, i.e. the necessity experienced by an species 
that struggles for survival in a dangerous environment. It should be added that the production of the 
historical dualism that separates humanity from nature is reinforced by an «ideational» dualism: a 
body of ideas and beliefs whose funcion is to justify human dominion over nature -thus legitimizing 
what was already being done by humans across the planet. It is the success of this fiction -the fiction 
that humans are ontologically separated from nature- what explains the shock provoked by Darwin's 
explanation about the human lineage. 
 
Now, the human ability to transform the physical environment has been translated into evolutionary 
terms by the so-called Niche Construction Theory, which sees ecological engineering on the part of 
humans as a potential contributor to evolution. Instead of subscribing to the standard view that 
organisms always adapt to their environments and never vice versa, Niche Construction Theory 
argues that organisms change their environments, thus describing a dynamic, reciprocal interaction 
between the processes of natural selection and niche-construction: 
 
“From the niche-construction perspective, evolution is based on cycles of causation and feedback; organisms 
drive environmental change and organism- modified environments subsequently select organisms. (…) Niche-
construction is not just an end product of evolution, but a cause of evolutionary change” (Laland and Brown 
2006: 96).  
 
Niche-construction would not be the effect of a prior cause (namely, natural selection), but also a 
cause of evolutionary change (Laland and Brown 2006: 6). Whereas the conventional view of 
evolution is that species acquire through natural selection those traits that best enable them to 
survive and reproduce in their environment, restricting the locus of such changes to organisms, 
Niche Construction Theory describes how changes in environments must also be held responsible 
for species' adaptation (Laland & O'Brien 2012). On their part, the offspring of those organisms that 
have changed their environments in order to suit their metabolic needs will inherit a transformed 
environment (Odling-Smee 2010: 180). As Zev Trachtenberg, who has called attention to niche-
construction's relevance for environmental political theory, points out: 
 
«The niche should not be understood primarily in physical terms, as the surroundings of a given animal, 
containing its food. Rather an animal's niche should be understood in functional terms: for example, what, in 
its surroundings, its particular capabilities render avalaible to it to eat» (Trachtenberg 2019: 87; my emphasis). 
 
If follows that the transformative capabilities of human beings will be especially significant when 
compared to the transformative capabilities of other species that also manage to change their 
environments -from beavers to ants. Human beings are specially effective niche constructors due to 
their capacity for generating culture (see Smith 2007; Kendal et al. 2010), which is synonimous with 
their capacity to act collectively and learn socially (see Ellis 2015). The latter is arguably the key 
factor, since culture -mediated by language- allows humans to accumulate and propagate the 
techniques that have been employed by particular groups in their adaptation to the environment. 
Human systems are thus an important driver of biospheric change and the fact that their force 
cannot be compared to that of the long carbon cycle, glaciations or asteroids does not make it less 
potent. 
 
But is the described dualism a universal reality? Are we not «naturalizing» a typically Western 
phenomenon? What about those communities where a different conception of nature can be found? 
Brazillian anthropologist Eduardo Viveros de Castro (2014) has described how a number of 
Amazonian and Amerindian peoples do not see plants and animals as different species, but rather as 
«personas» endowed with consciousness, language and culture -personas that happen to inhabit a 
body that is different than ours. Another anthropologist, Philippe Descola (2013), suggests that the 
diversity of representations of the natural world attests to the uselessness of the human-nature 
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dualism. Describing premodern cultures as victims of a superstition that has since been unmasked 
by scientific research would in itself be the product of an arrogant superstition. 
 
They have a point. The task of decolonizing Western thought, which allows us to see from the outside 
the concepts and categories that organise our worldview, points to the limits of universalism -let 
alone the universality of the Western worldview. Still, the survival of monist communities that feel 
closely connected to nature does not invalidate the argument that I have been presenting. In which 
form and how intensely a natural environment is actively transformed by a human population that 
is engaged in niche-construction will depend on a number of circumstances, but such transformation 
-mild or aggressive- will take place. Mounting evidence, for instance, suggest that Pre-Columbian 
populations actively cultivated Amazonian biodiversity (see Roberts et al. 2017). Now, it is 
reasonable to suppose that small populations that do not rely on complex technologies will more 
easily sustain monist beliefs. The communities described by anthropologists stay more or less 
isolated and exhibit a material dualism -since they are engaged in niche construction - that is not yet 
reinforced by an ideational dualism. The latter is most fully developed in Europe through a process 
we now call «Modernity» and is later globalized: 
 
«The societies situated around the North Atlantic rim of Europe, who first experienced the scientific revolution 
and the enlightenment, and were convulsed by further forces of industrialization, urbanization and capitalist 
social relations, are quite unusual in human history in terms of how they conceptualized socio-ecological 
relations (...) there is clearly a move in such societies to increasingly separate "society" and "nature" into 
distinct and clearly demarcated spheres (...) that associate human betterment with "the domination of 
nature"» (White, Rudy & Gareau 2015: 46) 
 
Social complexity brings about further distance with the natural environment and facilitates the 
spread of technologies that contribute to the human domination. It is an ambiguous process: farming 
machinery liberates oxes, while other animals become more thoroughly exploited. Yet all human 
cultures, albeit in different degrees, have practiced domination. And this intuition is confirmed by 
the Anthropocene, which reminds us the importance of human niche-construction for 
understanding current planetary conditions. As Isendahl (2010) suggests, the Anthropocene forces 
us to reconsider adaptationist models of human-environment interactions, as the emphasis shifts 
from defensive adaptation to human transformation. There is a catch: the problem is also the 
potential solution, since human agency understood as a problem-solving resource is more diverse 
than is usually suggested when we describe people as inherently destructive to their environments.  
 
5. Towards an Alternative 
Understanding of Human Domination (II). 
 
Aggresive human adaptation through niche-construction has so far been described as a «blind» 
process lacking in self-reflection. A different perspective is opened, however, once we introduce 
normative criteria that replace the logic of the species with that of a moral subject that takes into 
account the impact -intentional or not- of her actions. This moral perspective sheds a different light 
on animal exploitation, species extinction or landscape deterioration. Satisfying metabolic needs 
ceases to be the only criteria according to which our practices and beliefs are judged. But this shift 
can only take place if human self-reflection is exerted. 
 
Steven Vogel (2016) mades a very apt point when arguing that the dualism between humans and 
nature as it is criticized by environmental thinkers is not overcome by seeing humans as passive 
elements of a greater whole. On the contrary, and this chimes with the notion of an emergent dualism 
and niche construction theory, it requires that we accept that humans are as transformative as their 
environments. Both humans and the environment are engaged in a mutually transformative process, 
the result of which can be disappointing and even outright disgusting -and that is what alienates us. 
So Vogel: 
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«Alienation, I am suggesting, arises not from our transformation of the world but rather from our failure to 
recognize ourselves in the world we have transformed -a failure, that is, to acknowledge responsibility for 
what we have done and what we have built» (Vogel 2016: 91). 
 
To overcome domination, the main factor is human self-awareness. We must come to terms with our 
ability to shape the environment -either unwillingly, as a side-effect of our habitation, or willingly, as 
the product of particular choices about how to inhabit it. So far, choices have not been made 
regarding the shape of socionatural relations «if choices are understood as the outcome of conscious 
social decision-making» (Vogel 2016: 230). The human community, in other words, has failed as a 
community. Only when conscious decisions have been made regarding socionatural relations will 
we be able to judge the outcome as the kind of managed environment supported by self-conscious 
human beings. As Vogel puts it: «Practices that know themselves as such (...) are superior to those 
that are engaged in thoughtlessly, unconsciously, without self-recognition» (Vogel 2016: 231). This 
logic is implicit in the narrative of the Anthropocene -the anthropogenic impact precedes its 
recognition. The official recognition of the Anthropocene would thus be a first step in the road to 
collective self-awareness. 
 
Does this recognition come too late? If we take a long view, it does not: human self-awareness could 
not have arrived much sooner, since the conditions for it were simply missing. Nietzsche will help 
us to see why. In the first volume of Human, All Too Human, he suggests that goods are not classified 
according to moral criteria but rather spontaneously, so that they are first listed and then depicted 
as moral or immoral. And the viewpoint of the agent is a key factor in this judgement: «all of us, in 
fact, when the difference between us and another being is quite large, no longer feel any sense of 
injustice, and so we kill a gnat, for instance, without any remorse» (Nietzsche 2000: 67). Moreover, 
Nietzsche goes on, cruelty should not be evaluated without taking into consideration the different 
viewpoints of those involved: 
 
«Indeed, no cruel person is cruel to as great an extent as the one whom he mistreats believes; imagining pain 
is not the same as suffering it. (...) Cause and effect are in all these cases surrounded by completely different 
clusters of sensations and thoughts; wheres we automatically assume that perpetrator and sufferer think and 
feel alike, and in accordance with this assumption measure the guilt of the one by the pain of the other» 
(Nietzsche 2000: 67-68). 
 
Jokingly, Nietzsche points out how different our toothache is when compared with the pain we feel 
-out of pity- as we watch someone whose teeth ache... When we reflect upon past human domination 
of nature, then, we cannot forget how different our ancestors were -so different that they did not 
feel, as we may now do, that nature was being «dominated». On this, Nietzsche emphasizes that 
morality is context-dependent, so that what we call moral progress is the result of a process that 
cannot be hastened. This should refrain us from judging others harshly: 
 
«When considering earlier periods, we must take care not to slip into unfair abuse of them. The injustice in 
slavery, the cruelty in the subjugation of persons and peoples, cannot be measured by our standards. For at 
that time the instinct of justice had not yet been developed very far» (Nietzsche 2000: 77). 
 
But it would also be a mistake to think that past humans were wrong and we are right: by applying 
this criteria for moral progress, we are wrong too. All actions are in a sense stupid, Nietzsche argues, 
because human intelligence will always evolve. In other words, in the eyes of future humans we will 
be judged as evil or stupid as past humans look in our eyes. A key insight follows: «That another 
being suffers must be learned: and it can never be fully learned» (Nietzsche 2000: 78). It can never 
be fully learned because we cannot have access, phenomenologically speaking, to other beings. Yet 
Nietzsche is confident that humanity can actually improve its moral record -it actually does so. In 
the changeable field of morality, everything streams towards a single goal: 
 
«The inherited habit of erroneously loving, hating may still hold sway in us, but under the influence of 
increasing knowledge it will become weaker: the new habit of comprehending, not loving, not hating, 
overlooking is gradually implanting itself in the same soil within us and will in some thousands of years 
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perhaps be powerful enough to give humanity the strength to bring forth a wise, innocent human being (one 
conscious of his innocence) as regularly as it now brings forth -as the necessary, preliminary stage to him, not 
his opposite- human beings who are unwise, unjust, conscious of their guilt» (Nietzsche 2000: 84). 
 
He might as well be talking about socionatural relations and the way in which the morality of human-
animal relations have evolved. Human domination may have continued and it has increased from a 
quantitative standpoint, but at the same time there has been a gradual change in how animals and 
the natural world writ large are perceived by human beings -especially by those who live in rich 
societies. There is thus a qualitative change that, however, is far from enough as far as the autonomy 
or integrity of nonhumans is concerned. 
 
Following Nietzsche's insight, though, morality is slowly streaming -a whole new set of meanings 
has emerged in the last fifty years that radically changes the moral consideration of nonhumans. This 
is arguably the precondition for, if not eliminating, at least softening human domination. In this 
respect, the Anthropocene is not necessarily a deepening of human domination but rather an open 
sign whose meaning is not fixed and can actually be taken as an opportunity to refine socionatural 
relations. The last section of the paper will briefly explore how this can be done. 
 
6.  Domination in the (good) Anthropocene. 
 
Can the human domination of nature be reduced in the Anthropocene? If so, how? My main argument 
is that the removal of dominating practices can be linked to planetary management, which in turn is 
demanded for keeping the planet habitable. While the complete absence of domination will remain 
an ideal goal for the time being, an enlightened or managed domination can meaningfully reduce the 
harm done to nature in a non-ideal world and prepare us for a future where humanity self-
consciously overcomes the acquired habit of domination. 
 
I will start by pointing out how a realistic position is advisable when dealing with domination: 
neither total domination nor total liberation are viable in the foreseeable future. It would be reckless 
to pursue the former; as for the latter, the Anthropocene shows us that the friction between humans 
and nature is unavoidable because our presence in the world is in itself disruptive and leads to a 
variable degree of domination. Hence the goal should not be the complete liberation of nature, but 
rather reducing domination and eliminating the most harmful forms that it currently adopts. A quick 
illustration: if no more birds were ever caged for human recreational use and the life conditions of 
chickens were significantly improved across Western societies, we would at the same time be 
removing a particular form of domination (caging birds) and reducing a persistent form of 
domination (jamming chickens in factories). This may be deemed an insufficient progress on the face 
of human suffering, but from the vantage point of current domination is not so meaningless. 
 
As Robert Garner has suggested in relation to animals, the Rawlsian distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theories of justice can be very useful when dealing with socionatural relations (see Garner 
2013, Simmons 2010). An ideal theory of justice take human beings as they are and the laws as they 
could be, so that a theory of justice that wishes to change humans is utopian while one that seeks to 
change contingent human arrangements is ideal. On its part, a nonideal theory is that which actually 
ponders how a given goal could be reached attending to existing social conditions. But a strong 
version of a nonideal theory of justice goes further and argues that a political philosophy that does 
not take the real world into account is a bad theory. Now, Garner's views on animal liberation can 
easily be applied to nature's liberation. Following the Rawlsian distinction, the removal of 
domination is more utopical than ideal -it asks too much from human beings and does not take into 
consideration the moral differences between humans and the rest of nature.  
 
On the other hand, if we wish to refine socionatural relations -a wider goal encompassing the 
reduction of domination- we do not have to be ethically «pure», but rather accept all kinds of 
theoretical or moral justifications provided they all converge in the same direction. It should not be 
a problem that some people wish to alleviate the burden of nonhumans in order to prevent 
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unsustainability, while others try to defend the intrinsic value of nature and still others argue that 
the natural world is religiously sacred. This value difference will lead to disagreements about the 
measures or policies to be implemented, but this is a minor evil if compared with the absence of 
arguments against domination. Obviously, there must be enough people concerned with nature's 
predicament for public policies and private behaviors to be changed -a general indifference for the 
lack of nonhumans is a hopeless starting point for reducing domination. Therefore, the question is 
not just whether the «Homo dominatus» can become «wise» in the Anthropocene (Lewis and Maslin 
2018), but also whether humans can be gentler to nature. 
 
So far, I have suggested that the Anthropocene may help to instil a feeling of helplessness in living 
humans, insofar as they realize that they are «earthly creatures» whose existence depends on a 
fragile planet -the habitability of which cannot be taken for granted. This feeling can in turn be 
extended to other, nonhuman beings who share the same fate. To put it differently, the 
Anthropocene can -should- facilitate the emergence of planetary subjectivities, i.e. individuals aware 
of their earthly condition that are eager to contribute to planetary stability. Mark Sagoff has shed 
doubts on the ability of the Anthropocene to change people's perceptions: 
 
«The human imagination cannot in any way reckon or fathom the depth of geologic time; in relation to that 
scale, human beings are unable to comprehend how vanishingly insignificant and epiphenomenal their tenure 
on the planet has been» (Sagoff 2018). 
 
He might be right. Yet the proliferation of extreme weather events combined with greater media 
attention to planetary systems can end up making a difference, especially as climate change goes 
from abstract concept to lived experience. There is no guarantee that this will happen, but admittedly 
there is no guarantee that any environmental argument will be accepted -let alone those that 
demand respect for nature's autonomy. It may be tempting to fantasize, as Joan Cocks has done, 
about «a benevolent monarch with absolute power to impose earth-friendly rules of behavior on the 
entire human race» (Cocks 2013: 139). But if any such eco-sovereign comes to life, he will be 
concerned with sustainability rather than with the «natural freedom» (Cock's phrasing) of all beings. 
Provided that an emancipatory eco-politics is not going to be embraced anytime soon, the epistemic 
and affective possibilities contained in the Anthropocene concept may well be explored. 
 
An emancipatory politics for the nonhuman world in the Anthropocene should thus take the form of 
an enlightened domination that simultaneously tries to exert a sustainable control of socionatural 
relations and take steps to remove or reduce existing practices of domination. Instead of human 
dominion over nature, a reflective control of socionatural interactions should be encouraged. That 
is what lies behind our attempts to slow down global warming or the identification of planetary 
boundaries that should not be trespassed. From this viewpoint, sustainability is the most 
accomplished form of control. Within this framework, the stability of planetary systems and the 
managed liberation of nonhumans are two different things that can however be connected. For the 
planet to be habitable for us, we need them, i.e. enough biodiversity. A scientific argument (stabilizing 
natural systems) can thus reinforce a moral one (reducing domination). It would be preferable that 
the moral argument could suffice, but that is too risky a bet: Dobson's private ecologist had reasons 
to adopt a different persona when going public. 
 
Two different, albeit complementary measures can be singled out.  On the one hand, the imperative 
of habitability (sustainability on a global, desperate scale) can serve as a justification for creating 
vast natural zones free of human intervention. On the other, common spaces where human beings 
coexist with nature may help them to realize that the latter is made up of sentient and living beings 
assembled in complex habitats that should not be subjected to human ends. Both policies can 
reinforce each other: controlled access to free habitats can have educative impact on citizens, while 
the gradual developement of an ethics of coexistence might increase popular support fot such 
liberated zones. 
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Before providing more detail on this, a contradiction that is apparent in this position should be 
briefly addressed. Namely: if rather than nature and society there is a socionatural entanglement 
characterized by hybridization and anthropogenic colonization, how can we «liberate» nature? Had 
it not «ended» a long time ago? I have discussed this at length elsewhere (see Arias-Maldonado 
2015). Suffice it to say that the thesis that nature has ended alludes to a historical process whereby 
the natural world becomes less and less independent from humanity, while human beings increase 
their ability to transform and recreate nature. It does not mean that nature is literally «dead», nor 
does it involve denying that  humans ultimately depend on the physical and chemical structures that 
makes up «deep nature» (see Soper 1995). In fact, the Anthropocene is a bitter reminder that there 
are elements of nature that exist beyond our control. Then again, recognizing that we cannot go back 
to untouched ecosystems does not mean «that society should give up on setting aspirations, goals, 
or targets for environmental protection» (Dryzek & Pickering 2019: 90). There is thus no 
contradiction between describing socionatural hybridization and prescribing environmental 
protection. 
 
Interestingly, the creation of natural areas free of human interference can serve two complementary 
goals. On the one hand, it would help to restore biodiversity and thus planetary systems; on the 
other, it increases the autonomy of nonhumans and thus allows them to flourish. Edward O. Wilson 
has made the bolder proposal: «comitting half of the planet's surface to nature (...) to save the 
immensity of life-forms that compose it» (Wilson 2016: 3). He combines instrumental and moral 
reasons for backing a proposal whose scientific foundation is no other than the key relation between 
habitat availability and species integrity. In the Anthropocene, though, freeing nature is up to us: 
«The only hope for the species still living is a human effort commensurate with the magnitude of the 
problem» (Wilson 2016: 187; my emphasis). The same goes for «rewilding», which, as Lewis and 
Maslin have pointed out, should accompany the creation of human-free areas: «Rewilding is both an 
act of unbounded restoration, and an act of mitigating against the negative impacts of rapid 
environmental change in the Anthropocene» (Lewis & Maslin 2018: 411). Wilson's proposal is the 
most ambitious manifestation of the «decoupling» of natural systems and social production 
encouraged by ecomodernist thinkers (see Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015). Yet decoupling does not have 
to be seen as a «hypermodern» idea that doubles the aggression against nature. It can also be 
understood as «a kind of reflexive modernity» (Lynch & Veland 2018: 75). Hence its inescapable 
ambiguity -that of modernity itself. 
 
Such ambiguity can also be found in practices that link humans to nature. We have seen that radical 
ecologists are against national parks and reservations, since animals do not really escape from 
human supervision while living in them. And yet, national parks are one of the «steps toward 
reconciliation» singled out by Soengten (2018): given that complete reconciliation is an utopian goal, 
creating spaces where animals do not feel humans as a threat is not a minor achievement. Even safari 
tourism that focuses on endangered species can produce positive results despite the kind of «crisis-
voyeurism» it involves, as it can move travellers to adopt a stronger conservationism (see Heise 
2010: 151-152). There must thus be some kind of contact between humans and animals, be them in 
national parks or urban spaces, for a new perception of nonhumans to spread -otherwise 
domination will continue to be invisible or meaningless to most people. If our most radical hope lies 
in a «perpetual self-transformation of life in all its forms» that awakens us to a complex 
sociobiological reality shared with other beings (see Mussgnug 2019), then this awakening must be 
elicited. 
 
In sum, decoupling projects that seriously attempt to surrender vast territories to nonhumans seem 
to be the kind of aesthetic, affective, and cultural breakup that we need in order to start changing 
the way we relate to the rest of nature. The self-renewing ability of nature as exhibited in those free 
zones could be an epistemic trigger that encourages a less dominating -or more enlightened- human 
relation to nature. If that happens, it will make no difference whether we have set up these liberated 
areas to protect endangered animals or to prevent a loss of biodiversity that endangers our survival. 
In the Anthropocene, therefore, nature's liberation can only be the paradoxical result of managed 
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domination. Admittedly, it might as well not happen: the mistreatment of animals and the damage 
to their habitats may well continue in the future. All the more reason, then, to try to prevent it. 
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